There were challenges to materials used in college classes, and 30 to academic libraries. There are isolated cases of challenges to library materials made available in or by prisons, special libraries, community groups, and students. The vast majority of challenges were initiated by parents 2, , with patrons and administrators to follow and respectively. This number reflects all the challenges we received since July 31, for the time period. OIF has only been collecting data about banned banned books since , so we do not have any lists of frequently challenged books or authors before that date.
Skip to main content. This YA novel was challenged and banned in multiple school districts because it discusses suicide.
The Bloody Chamber by Angela Carter. Because this individual is a normal genetic male who was exposed to male-typical hormones in prenatal and early neonatal life, this case lends credence to the view that gender identity is determined by early hormones that act on the developing brain and argues against the view that rearing sex is the main determinant of gender identity Diamond and Sigmundson, ; Grumbach and Conte, Kudos to Henstra for this intellectually stimulating story. If sex differences in human behavior are affected by the levels of androgens that are present during early development, then females with CAH should be behaviorally more masculine and less feminine 1 than a comparison group of females without CAH the best comparison group consists of the unaffected sisters of females with CAH because they provide a control for general genetic and environmental backgrounds. Other Sex Differences in Human Behavior Although identification as male or female is the most obvious psychological sex difference, it is far from the only one. From bisexuality to intersexuality: Rethinking gender categories. And this is problematic: in order to respond to oppression of women in general, feminists must understand them as a category in some sense.
The Absolutely True Diary of a Part-Time Indian written by Sherman Alexie Consistently challenged since its publication in for acknowledging issues such as poverty, alcoholism, and sexuality, this National Book Award winner was challenged in school curriculums because of profanity and situations that were deemed sexually explicit. I Am Jazz written by Jessica Herthel and Jazz Jennings and illustrated by Shelagh McNicholas This autobiographical picture book co-written by the year-old protagonist was challenged because it addresses gender identity. Harris Reasons: abortion, homosexuality, nudity, religious viewpoint, sex education, unsuited to age group Forever , by Judy Blume Reasons: offensive language, sexual content The Catcher in the Rye , by J.
Before OIF has only been collecting data about banned banned books since , so we do not have any lists of frequently challenged books or authors before that date. First, the corpus callosum is a highly variable piece of anatomy; as a result, generalisations about its size, shape and thickness that hold for women and men in general should be viewed with caution.
Second, differences in adult human corpus callosums are not found in infants; this may suggest that physical brain differences actually develop as responses to differential treatment. Third, given that visual-spatial skills like map reading can be improved by practice, even if women and men's corpus callosums differ, this does not make the resulting behavioural differences immutable. Fausto-Sterling b, chapter 5. Psychologists writing on transsexuality were the first to employ gender terminology in this sense. Although by and large a person's sex and gender complemented each other, separating out these terms seemed to make theoretical sense allowing Stoller to explain the phenomenon of transsexuality: transsexuals' sex and gender simply don't match.
Along with psychologists like Stoller, feminists found it useful to distinguish sex and gender. This enabled them to argue that many differences between women and men were socially produced and, therefore, changeable. Rubin's thought was that although biological differences are fixed, gender differences are the oppressive results of social interventions that dictate how women and men should behave.
However, since gender is social, it is thought to be mutable and alterable by political and social reform that would ultimately bring an end to women's subordination. In some earlier interpretations, like Rubin's, sex and gender were thought to complement one another.
That is, according to this interpretation, all humans are either male or female; their sex is fixed. But cultures interpret sexed bodies differently and project different norms on those bodies thereby creating feminine and masculine persons. Distinguishing sex and gender, however, also enables the two to come apart: they are separable in that one can be sexed male and yet be gendered a woman, or vice versa Haslanger b; Stoljar So, this group of feminist arguments against biological determinism suggested that gender differences result from cultural practices and social expectations. Nowadays it is more common to denote this by saying that gender is socially constructed.
But which social practices construct gender, what social construction is and what being of a certain gender amounts to are major feminist controversies. There is no consensus on these issues.
See the entry on intersections between analytic and continental feminism for more on different ways to understand gender. One way to interpret Beauvoir's claim that one is not born but rather becomes a woman is to take it as a claim about gender socialisation: females become women through a process whereby they acquire feminine traits and learn feminine behaviour.
Masculinity and femininity are thought to be products of nurture or how individuals are brought up. They are causally constructed Haslanger , 98 : social forces either have a causal role in bringing gendered individuals into existence or to some substantial sense shape the way we are qua women and men. And the mechanism of construction is social learning.
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Feminine and masculine gender-norms, however, are problematic in that gendered behaviour conveniently fits with and reinforces women's subordination so that women are socialised into subordinate social roles: they learn to be passive, ignorant, docile, emotional helpmeets for men Millett , That is, feminists should aim to diminish the influence of socialisation. Social learning theorists hold that a huge array of different influences socialise us as women and men.
This being the case, it is extremely difficult to counter gender socialisation. For instance, parents often unconsciously treat their female and male children differently. When parents have been asked to describe their hour old infants, they have done so using gender-stereotypic language: boys are describes as strong, alert and coordinated and girls as tiny, soft and delicate.
Some socialisation is more overt: children are often dressed in gender stereotypical clothes and colours boys are dressed in blue, girls in pink and parents tend to buy their children gender stereotypical toys. According to social learning theorists, children are also influenced by what they observe in the world around them. This, again, makes countering gender socialisation difficult. For one, children's books have portrayed males and females in blatantly stereotypical ways: for instance, males as adventurers and leaders, and females as helpers and followers.
Some publishers have attempted an alternative approach by making their characters, for instance, gender-neutral animals or genderless imaginary creatures like TV's Teletubbies. However, parents reading books with gender-neutral or genderless characters often undermine the publishers' efforts by reading them to their children in ways that depict the characters as either feminine or masculine. According to Renzetti and Curran, parents labelled the overwhelming majority of gender-neutral characters masculine whereas those characters that fit feminine gender stereotypes for instance, by being helpful and caring were labelled feminine , Socialising influences like these are still thought to send implicit messages regarding how females and males should act and are expected to act shaping us into feminine and masculine persons.
Instead, she holds that gender is a matter of having feminine and masculine personalities that develop in early infancy as responses to prevalent parenting practices. In particular, gendered personalities develop because women tend to be the primary caretakers of small children.
Chodorow holds that because mothers or other prominent females tend to care for infants, infant male and female psychic development differs. Crudely put: the mother-daughter relationship differs from the mother-son relationship because mothers are more likely to identify with their daughters than their sons.
This unconsciously prompts the mother to encourage her son to psychologically individuate himself from her thereby prompting him to develop well defined and rigid ego boundaries. However, the mother unconsciously discourages the daughter from individuating herself thereby prompting the daughter to develop flexible and blurry ego boundaries. Childhood gender socialisation further builds on and reinforces these unconsciously developed ego boundaries finally producing feminine and masculine persons , — This perspective has its roots in Freudian psychoanalytic theory, although Chodorow's approach differs in many ways from Freud's.
Gendered personalities are supposedly manifested in common gender stereotypical behaviour. Take emotional dependency. Women are stereotypically more emotional and emotionally dependent upon others around them, supposedly finding it difficult to distinguish their own interests and wellbeing from the interests and wellbeing of their children and partners.
This is said to be because of their blurry and somewhat confused ego boundaries: women find it hard to distinguish their own needs from the needs of those around them because they cannot sufficiently individuate themselves from those close to them. By contrast, men are stereotypically emotionally detached, preferring a career where dispassionate and distanced thinking are virtues. These traits are said to result from men's well-defined ego boundaries that enable them to prioritise their own needs and interests sometimes at the expense of others' needs and interests.
Chodorow thinks that these gender differences should and can be changed. Feminine and masculine personalities play a crucial role in women's oppression since they make females overly attentive to the needs of others and males emotionally deficient. In order to correct the situation, both male and female parents should be equally involved in parenting Chodorow , This would help in ensuring that children develop sufficiently individuated senses of selves without becoming overly detached, which in turn helps to eradicate common gender stereotypical behaviours.
Catharine MacKinnon develops her theory of gender as a theory of sexuality. Very roughly: the social meaning of sex gender is created by sexual objectification of women whereby women are viewed and treated as objects for satisfying men's desires MacKinnon For MacKinnon, gender is constitutively constructed : in defining genders or masculinity and femininity we must make reference to social factors see Haslanger , As a result, genders are by definition hierarchical and this hierarchy is fundamentally tied to sexualised power relations.
If sexuality ceased to be a manifestation of dominance, hierarchical genders that are defined in terms of sexuality would cease to exist. So, gender difference for MacKinnon is not a matter of having a particular psychological orientation or behavioural pattern; rather, it is a function of sexuality that is hierarchal in patriarchal societies. This is not to say that men are naturally disposed to sexually objectify women or that women are naturally submissive.
Instead, male and female sexualities are socially conditioned: men have been conditioned to find women's subordination sexy and women have been conditioned to find a particular male version of female sexuality as erotic — one in which it is erotic to be sexually submissive. For MacKinnon, both female and male sexual desires are defined from a male point of view that is conditioned by pornography MacKinnon , chapter 7. This conditions men's sexuality so that they view women's submission as sexy.
And male dominance enforces this male version of sexuality onto women, sometimes by force. MacKinnon's thought is not that male dominance is a result of social learning see 2. That is, socialized differences in masculine and feminine traits, behaviour, and roles are not responsible for power inequalities. Females and males roughly put are socialised differently because there are underlying power inequalities. MacKinnon, then, sees legal restrictions on pornography as paramount to ending women's subordinate status that stems from their gender.
The positions outlined above share an underlying metaphysical perspective on gender: gender realism. All women are thought to differ from all men in this respect or respects. For example, MacKinnon thought that being treated in sexually objectifying ways is the common condition that defines women's gender and what women as women share. All women differ from all men in this respect. Further, pointing out females who are not sexually objectified does not provide a counterexample to MacKinnon's view. Being sexually objectified is constitutive of being a woman; a female who escapes sexual objectification, then, would not count as a woman.
One may want to critique the three accounts outlined by rejecting the particular details of each account. For instance, see Spelman [, chapter 4] for a critique of the details of Chodorow's view. A more thoroughgoing critique has been levelled at the general metaphysical perspective of gender realism that underlies these positions.
It has come under sustained attack on two grounds: first, that it fails to take into account racial, cultural and class differences between women particularity argument ; second, that it posits a normative ideal of womanhood normativity argument. Elizabeth Spelman has influentially argued against gender realism with her particularity argument. Roughly: gender realists mistakenly assume that gender is constructed independently of race, class, ethnicity and nationality. If gender were separable from, for example, race and class in this manner, all women would experience womanhood in the same way.
And this is clearly false. For instance, Harris and Stone criticise MacKinnon's view, that sexual objectification is the common condition that defines women's gender, for failing to take into account differences in women's backgrounds that shape their sexuality. In fact, the rape of a black woman was thought to be impossible Harris So, the argument goes sexual objectification cannot serve as the common condition for womanhood since it varies considerably depending on one's race and class.
Betty Friedan's well-known work is a case in point of white solipsism. But she failed to realize that women from less privileged backgrounds, often poor and non-white, already worked outside the home to support their families. Friedan's suggestion, then, was applicable only to a particular sub-group of women white middle-class Western housewives. But it was mistakenly taken to apply to all women's lives — a mistake that was generated by Friedan's failure to take women's racial and class differences into account hooks , 1—3.
Spelman further holds that since social conditioning creates femininity and societies and sub-groups that condition it differ from one another, femininity must be differently conditioned in different societies. This line of thought has been extremely influential in feminist philosophy. For instance, Young holds that Spelman has definitively shown that gender realism is untenable , Mikkola argues that this isn't so.
The arguments Spelman makes do not undermine the idea that there is some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines women's gender; they simply point out that some particular ways of cashing out what defines womanhood are misguided. So, although Spelman is right to reject those accounts that falsely take the feature that conditions white middle-class Western feminists' gender to condition women's gender in general, this leaves open the possibility that women qua women do share something that defines their gender.
See also Haslanger [a] for a discussion of why gender realism is not necessarily untenable, and Stoljar  for a discussion of Mikkola's critique of Spelman. Butler's normativity argument is not straightforwardly directed at the metaphysical perspective of gender realism, but rather at its political counterpart: identity politics. This is a form of political mobilization based on membership in some group e.
Feminist identity politics, then, presupposes gender realism in that feminist politics is said to be mobilized around women as a group or category where membership in this group is fixed by some condition, experience or feature that women supposedly share and that defines their gender. Butler's normativity argument makes two claims. In their attempt to undercut biologically deterministic ways of defining what it means to be a woman, feminists inadvertedly created new socially constructed accounts of supposedly shared femininity.
Butler's second claim is that such false gender realist accounts are normative. Some explanation for this comes from Butler's view that all processes of drawing categorical distinctions involve evaluative and normative commitments; these in turn involve the exercise of power and reflect the conditions of those who are socially powerful Witt In order to better understand Butler's critique, consider her account of gender performativity. For her, standard feminist accounts take gendered individuals to have some essential properties qua gendered individuals or a gender core by virtue of which one is either a man or a woman.
This view assumes that women and men, qua women and men, are bearers of various essential and accidental attributes where the former secure gendered persons' persistence through time as so gendered. But according to Butler this view is false: i there are no such essential properties, and ii gender is an illusion maintained by prevalent power structures.
First, feminists are said to think that genders are socially constructed in that they have the following essential attributes Butler , 24 : women are females with feminine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at men; men are males with masculine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at women. These are the attributes necessary for gendered individuals and those that enable women and men to persist through time as women and men. Think back to what was said above: having a certain conception of what women are like that mirrors the conditions of socially powerful white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western women functions to marginalize and police those who do not fit this conception.
These gender cores, supposedly encoding the above traits, however, are nothing more than illusions created by ideals and practices that seek to render gender uniform through heterosexism, the view that heterosexuality is natural and homosexuality is deviant Butler , Gender cores are constructed as if they somehow naturally belong to women and men thereby creating gender dimorphism or the belief that one must be either a masculine male or a feminine female.
But gender dimorphism only serves a heterosexist social order by implying that since women and men are sharply opposed, it is natural to sexually desire the opposite sex or gender. Further, being feminine and desiring men for instance are standardly assumed to be expressions of one's gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being.
Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity amongst others makes her gendered a woman. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed Butler , —9. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways.
For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement. Many people, including many feminists, have ordinarily taken sex ascriptions to be solely a matter of biology with no social or cultural dimension. It is commonplace to think that there are only two sexes and that biological sex classifications are utterly unproblematic.
By contrast, some feminists have argued that sex classifications are not unproblematic and that they are not solely a matter of biology. In order to make sense of this, it is helpful to distinguish object- and idea-construction see Haslanger b for more : social forces can be said to construct certain kinds of objects e. First, take the object-construction of sexed bodies.
Secondary sex characteristics, or the physiological and biological features commonly associated with males and females, are affected by social practices.
In some societies, females' lower social status has meant that they have been fed less and so, the lack of nutrition has had the effect of making them smaller in size Jaggar , Uniformity in muscular shape, size and strength within sex categories is not caused entirely by biological factors, but depends heavily on exercise opportunities: if males and females were allowed the same exercise opportunities and equal encouragement to exercise, it is thought that bodily dimorphism would diminish Fausto-Sterling a, A number of medical phenomena involving bones like osteoporosis have social causes directly related to expectations about gender, women's diet and their exercise opportunities Fausto-Sterling These examples suggest that physiological features thought to be sex-specific traits not affected by social and cultural factors are, after all, to some extent products of social conditioning.
Social conditioning, then, shapes our biology. Second, take the idea-construction of sex concepts. Our concept of sex is said to be a product of social forces in the sense that what counts as sex is shaped by social meanings. This understanding is fairly recent.
Females' genitals were thought to be the same as males' but simply directed inside the body; ovaries and testes for instance were referred to by the same term and whether the term referred to the former or the latter was made clear by the context Laqueur , 4.
For an alternative view, see King She estimates that 1. In her [a], Fausto-Sterling notes that these labels were put forward tongue—in—cheek. Recognition of intersexes suggests that feminists and society at large are wrong to think that humans are either female or male. However, she was discovered to have XY chromosomes and was barred from competing in women's sports Fausto-Sterling b, 1—3. Deciding what sex is involves evaluative judgements that are influenced by social factors. Insofar as our cultural conceptions affect our understandings of sex, feminists must be much more careful about sex classifications and rethink what sex amounts to Stone , chapter 1.
More specifically, intersexed people illustrate that sex traits associated with females and males need not always go together and that individuals can have some mixture of these traits. This suggest to Stone that sex is a cluster concept: it is sufficient to satisfy enough of the sex features that tend to cluster together in order to count as being of a particular sex.
But, one need not satisfy all of those features or some arbitrarily chosen supposedly necessary sex feature, like chromosomes Stone , Further, intersexes along with trans people are located at the centre of the sex spectrum and in many cases their sex will be indeterminate Stone More recently, Ayala and Vasilyeva have argued for an inclusive and extended conception of sex: just as certain tools can be seen to extend our minds beyond the limits of our brains e.
This view aims to motivate the idea that what counts as sex should not be determined by looking inwards at genitalia or other anatomical features. In addition to arguing against identity politics and for gender performativity, Butler holds that distinguishing biological sex from social gender is unintelligible. For her, both are socially constructed:. See also: Antony ; Gatens ; Grosz ; Prokhovnik Butler makes two different claims in the passage cited: that sex is a social construction, and that sex is gender.
To unpack her view, consider the two claims in turn. Prima facie , this implausibly implies that female and male bodies do not have independent existence and that if gendering activities ceased, so would physical bodies. This is not Butler's claim; rather, her position is that bodies viewed as the material foundations on which gender is constructed, are themselves constructed as if they provide such material foundations Butler For Butler, sexed bodies never exist outside social meanings and how we understand gender shapes how we understand sex , Sexed bodies are not empty matter on which gender is constructed and sex categories are not picked out on the basis of objective features of the world.
Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursively constructed : they are the way they are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they are classified for discursive construction, see Haslanger , Sex assignment calling someone female or male is normative Butler , 1.
In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act see the entry on Speech Acts. In effect, the doctor's utterance makes infants into girls or boys. We, then, engage in activities that make it seem as if sexes naturally come in two and that being female or male is an objective feature of the world, rather than being a consequence of certain constitutive acts that is, rather than being performative. And this is what Butler means in saying that physical bodies never exist outside cultural and social meanings, and that sex is as socially constructed as gender.
She does not deny that physical bodies exist. But, she takes our understanding of this existence to be a product of social conditioning: social conditioning makes the existence of physical bodies intelligible to us by discursively constructing sexed bodies through certain constitutive acts. For a helpful introduction to Butler's views, see Salih For Butler, sex assignment is always in some sense oppressive.
Again, this appears to be because of Butler's general suspicion of classification: sex classification can never be merely descriptive but always has a normative element reflecting evaluative claims of those who are powerful. Conducting a feminist genealogy of the body or examining why sexed bodies are thought to come naturally as female and male , then, should ground feminist practice Butler , 28—9.
Doing so enables feminists to identity how sexed bodies are socially constructed in order to resist such construction. Stone takes this to mean that sex is gender but goes on to question it arguing that the social construction of both sex and gender does not make sex identical to gender. According to Stone, it would be more accurate for Butler to say that claims about sex imply gender norms. To some extent the claim describes certain facts. But, it also implies that females are not expected to do much heavy lifting and that they would probably not be good at it.
So, claims about sex are not identical to claims about gender; rather, they imply claims about gender norms Stone , Grosz ; Prokhovnik The thought is that in oppositions like these, one term is always superior to the other and that the devalued term is usually associated with women Lloyd For instance, human subjectivity and agency are identified with the mind but since women are usually identified with their bodies, they are devalued as human subjects and agents.
This is said to be evident for instance in job interviews. Men are treated as gender-neutral persons and not asked whether they are planning to take time off to have a family. By contrast, that women face such queries illustrates that they are associated more closely than men with bodily features to do with procreation Prokhovnik , The opposition between mind and body, then, is thought to map onto the opposition between men and women.
The idea is that gender maps onto mind, sex onto body. That is, the s distinction understood sex as fixed by biology without any cultural or historical dimensions. This understanding, however, ignores lived experiences and embodiment as aspects of womanhood and manhood by separating sex from gender and insisting that womanhood is to do with the latter. Rather, embodiment must be included in one's theory that tries to figure out what it is to be a woman or a man.
First, claiming that gender is socially constructed implies that the existence of women and men is a mind-dependent matter. This suggests that we can do away with women and men simply by altering some social practices, conventions or conditions on which gender depends whatever those are.
However, ordinary social agents find this unintuitive given that ordinarily sex and gender are not distinguished. Second, claiming that gender is a product of oppressive social forces suggests that doing away with women and men should be feminism's political goal.
But this harbours ontologically undesirable commitments since many ordinary social agents view their gender to be a source of positive value.
So, feminism seems to want to do away with something that should not be done away with, which is unlikely to motivate social agents to act in ways that aim at gender justice. Given these problems, Mikkola argues that feminists should give up the distinction on practical political grounds. Feminism is the movement to end the oppression women as a group face. But, how should the category of women be understood if feminists accept the above arguments that gender construction is not uniform, that a sharp distinction between biological sex and social gender is false or at least not useful, and that various features associated with women play a role in what it is to be a woman, none of which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient like a variety of social roles, positions, behaviours, traits, bodily features and experiences?
Feminists must be able to address cultural and social differences in gender construction if feminism is to be a genuinely inclusive movement and be careful not to posit commonalities that mask important ways in which women qua women differ. These concerns among others have generated a situation where as Linda Alcoff puts it feminists aim to speak and make political demands in the name of women, at the same time rejecting the idea that there is a unified category of women , If feminist critiques of the category women are successful, then what if anything binds women together, what is it to be a woman, and what kinds of demands can feminists make on behalf of women?
Many have found the fragmentation of the category of women problematic for political reasons e. For instance, Young holds that accounts like Spelman's reduce the category of women to a gerrymandered collection of individuals with nothing to bind them together , Black women differ from white women but members of both groups also differ from one another with respect to nationality, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and economic position; that is, wealthy white women differ from working-class white women due to their economic and class positions.
These sub-groups are themselves diverse: for instance, some working-class white women in Northern Ireland are starkly divided along religious lines. So if we accept Spelman's position, we risk ending up with individual women and nothing to bind them together. And this is problematic: in order to respond to oppression of women in general, feminists must understand them as a category in some sense.
Some, then, take the articulation of an inclusive category of women to be the prerequisite for effective feminist politics and a rich literature has emerged that aims to conceptualise women as a group or a collective e. Articulations of this category can be divided into those that are: a gender nominalist — positions that deny there is something women qua women share and that seek to unify women's social kind by appealing to something external to women; and b gender realist — positions that take there to be something women qua women share although these realist positions differ significantly from those outlined in Section 2.
Below we will review some influential gender nominalist and gender realist positions. Before doing so, it is worth noting that not everyone is convinced that attempts to articulate an inclusive category of women can succeed or that worries about what it is to be a woman are in need of being resolved. Instead, Mikkola argues for giving up the quest, which in any case she argues poses no serious political obstacles. Young holds that women are not bound together by a shared feature or experience or set of features and experiences since she takes Spelman's particularity argument to have established definitely that no such feature exists , 13; see also: Frye ; Heyes Instead, women's category is unified by certain practico-inert realities or the ways in which women's lives and their actions are oriented around certain objects and everyday realities Young , 23—4.
For example, bus commuters make up a series unified through their individual actions being organised around the same practico-inert objects of the bus and the practice of public transport. Women make up a series unified through women's lives and actions being organised around certain practico-inert objects and realities that position them as women. Young identifies two broad groups of such practico-inert objects and realities. First, phenomena associated with female bodies physical facts , biological processes that take place in female bodies menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and social rules associated with these biological processes social rules of menstruation, for instance.
Second, gender-coded objects and practices: pronouns, verbal and visual representations of gender, gender-coded artefacts and social spaces, clothes, cosmetics, tools and furniture. So, women make up a series since their lives and actions are organised around female bodies and certain gender-coded objects. Although Young's proposal purports to be a response to Spelman's worries, Stone has questioned whether it is, after all, susceptible to the particularity argument: ultimately, on Young's view, something women as women share their practico-inert realities binds them together Stone Natalie Stoljar holds that unless the category of women is unified, feminist action on behalf of women cannot be justified , Stoljar too is persuaded by the thought that women qua women do not share anything unitary.
This prompts her to argue for resemblance nominalism. This is the view that a certain kind of resemblance relation holds between entities of a particular type for more on resemblance nominalism, see Armstrong , 39— Stoljar relies more on Price's resemblance nominalism whereby x is a member of some type F only if x resembles some paradigm or exemplar of F sufficiently closely Price , For instance, the type of red entities is unified by some chosen red paradigms so that only those entities that sufficiently resemble the paradigms count as red.
The type or category of women, then, is unified by some chosen woman paradigms so that those who sufficiently resemble the woman paradigms count as women Stoljar , Semantic considerations about the concept woman suggest to Stoljar that resemblance nominalism should be endorsed Stoljar , It seems unlikely that the concept is applied on the basis of some single social feature all and only women possess. Nonetheless, she holds that since the concept woman applies to at least some MTF trans persons, one can be a woman without being female Stoljar ,